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Abstract 
Identity is not a fixed and frozen prison-house for the self, 
but a liquid continuum, affected and shaped by the 
‘outside’ or the world.  The self, which is situated and 
which undergoes revisions and transformations, keeps 
identity as a frame within which it makes sense of things. 
On the one hand, there is a ‘history’ within which an 
identity is rooted and through which meaning-making is 
made possible, and on the other hand, every person 
aspires to be a ‘universal’ and recognition-worthy human 
being. Both inherent identity and inherent universality of 
the self should be considered in their interactions in the 
public sphere, which has been traditionally viewed as a 
space of discrete individualities. The ontological force of 
this argument aside, the paper demonstrates that 
reduction of an identity without crediting its aspiration 
for universality and consideration of universality without 
crediting the historical underpinnings of identity are both 
acts of violation. 
Keywords: Identity and History, Public Recognition 
1. Introduction 
The self is a socially entrenched being which is always in the 
making. It is negotiating with and affected by the social and 
cultural forces outside. Hence, an identity, single or collective, 
cannot be self-enclosed and insulated. The ambiguity regarding the 
essence of the self is inherently connected to the negativity of the 
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self. A non-substantial Hegelian ontology of the self dismisses any 
attempt to solidify self-identity, negate its indefinite possibilities, 
and reduce human beings to their immediate identity. Self-identity 
is nothing outside the relentless interpretive framework of 
transforming, discontinuing, reappropriating and refusing. Identity 
does not create and imprison its subject within its web; by their 
everyday doings and interpretations selves, in turn, are 
simultaneously making their identity just as they make themselves 
in that interpretive process. In other words, the interpretive or 
meaning-making activity of the self is a two-way process in the 
sense that the self makes itself meaningful with regard to its 
cultural situatedness and history while at the same time aspiring 
for the ideal of universality through its interactions and 
communications. Grounded in social rather than individual 
ontology and made or unmade by the ‘outside’, the self 
simultaneously aspires for universal meaning. In this paper, I will 
argue that the claim of an identity for recognition in the public 
sphere must consider both its historical situatedness and its 
aspiration for universality.  
In the first section, the author will establish the Hegelian 
conception of the negative self, which undergoes an ontological 
rupture or self-division due to its constitution by infinite 
experiences and exposures, and will emphasize on the need to 
recognize this reality concerning the self. I will then show how any 
public or political space of diversity should be seen as a space of 
tension between identity-assertion and aspiration for universality. 
My argument is that recognition of an identity must capture the 
space between the history of identity and its aspiration for 
universality, and that either essentialization/reduction of identity 
or universalization of mere ‘humanity’ is violence. 
2. Inescapable Horizons of Self-Identity and the Demand 
for Recognition 
Hegel engages with the question of the relation of the self to itself, 
others, history and the world when he discusses the dynamics of 
the self in Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel provides a dialectical 
account of the historical essence of the self, which is not simple and 
immediate, but complex and mediated, because there are no 
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immediate experiences that constitute the self. In his 
phenomenological investigation of experience, Hegel shows that a 
self inherently fails to have immediately given experiences and that 
all our seemingly ‘immediate experiences’ get constituted by 
‘mediation’ and subsequently we have only ‘mediated experiences’ 
(1977, p. 10). After establishing that we have only mediated, 
complex and infinite experiences, Hegel argues that we do not have 
a stable and fixed self-identity. 
Hegel dismisses the self as a given ‘immediate unity’ and 
establishes the self as a ‘process of its own becoming’. He describes 
the inherent negation of self-consciousness as “both the first 
division existing-in-itself of the simplicity of the concept and the 
return from out of this division” (1977, p. 457). The constant 
splitting apart of the self (self-division) and return out of the split 
into unity is the inherent character of the Hegelian self. This 
ceaseless determinately negating activity is essential to self-
actualization, to find the self’s ‘substantial’ basis and actuality in 
the world. The phenomenon of the human self and its experience is 
nothing but this endless process of self-replenishment and self-
repulsion. By establishing that our ‘immediate experiences’ get 
constituted by ‘mediation’ and thus we have only ‘mediated 
experiences,’ he conceptualizes a ‘negative’ self which undercuts a 
fixed self-consciousness in the case of both single and collective self 
(p. 20). That is, the self, single or collective, is the tumultuous 
movement, which necessarily and chaotically ‘sublates’ each stage 
of consciousness. Dismissal of the given immediate self and 
conceptualization of it as ‘negative’ takes Hegel to the basic point 
that the self is a socially entrenched being which is only it’s doing 
with the substance, thus in constant making. Put it in other words, 
there is only the social ontology of the self, and the individuality 
we take for granted is the negotiation of the substance—the social 
and cultural ethos outside the self in a particular way (a self-
negotiation). 
The social ontology of the self, radicalized by Hegel, revolutionized 
the concept of self and other, and transformed the concept of the 
public sphere and the debates in social and political philosophy 
concerning identity-recognition and rights movements. Primarily, 
if the self is embedded in society in its existence and essence, what 




are the implications for the identity of a human being? How far can 
one strive to be recognized in his/her identity? The Hegelian 
philosopher Charles Taylor in his phenomenological account of self 
and identity in Sources of the Self (1989) views identity as the 
category that provides the frame within which things have 
significance for us, and according to which we can determine 
where do we stand with regard to what is good, valuable, 
worthwhile, what we endorse or oppose. In line with the Hegelian 
non-substantial social ontology of the self, Taylor locates the self 
within ‘inescapable horizons’ with strongly valued preferences and 
‘constitutive concerns’ which according to him is its identity. He 
strongly argues against a ‘disengaged super individual’ and 
emphasizes that the self exists only through ‘constitutive concerns’ 
and ‘qualitative evaluations’ always orienting itself towards a space 
of questions about the good (1989, p. 33). He argues that human 
beings exist in historical ‘horizons’ or ‘frameworks’ which give 
meaning for the things significant to them. Thrust of his argument 
is on the relation of one’s identity to his/her moral evaluations or 
preferences in terms of good and bad.  
Taylor’s basic stand is a criticism against the liberal notion of the 
disengaged individual (without identity) and the liberal emphasis on 
the neutrality of the politics of rights. His conceptualization of the 
self as socially and culturally situated is against the liberal notion of 
the ‘universal’ rational being abstracted from all specific 
contingencies of context or history. According to Taylor, horizons 
are the ‘inescapable structural requirements of human agency’ and 
thus having an identity within them is what makes an individual 
actual ‘agent.’ He argues that it is this identity and agency that 
need to be recognized by others. In other words, from the inherent 
connection between identity and the conceptualization of the good, 
he ascertains what each self wants to get recognized by others. It is 
the horizon within which a self does meaning making and moral 
evaluations in life that needs to be recognized. Thus, for the 
Taylorian political project of the recognition of identity on the basis 
of inescapable horizons within which the self necessarily exists and 
makes meaning, the conceptualization of the atomistic individual 
cut off from the ‘horizons’ of evaluative concerns is a deliberate 
disregard for the significant aspects of a person’s identity.i Taylor 
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explicitly states that the one big problem of modern identity is the 
‘search for meaning’ (1989, p. 18).  
The fundamental connection between identity and recognition is 
based, according to Taylor, on the fundamental dialogical character 
of human life. The language we need for self-recognition is not 
acquired individually; rather, we are introduced to language by 
interaction with significant others who matter to us in life. One’s 
identity is defined only in ‘dialogue’ with or in ‘struggle’ against 
the moral concerns and evaluations of others which, according to 
him, is not a denial of individual agency altogether.ii For Taylor, 
identity and recognition are not only linked, but also “our identity 
is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the mis-
recognition of others” (1994, p. 25). That is, human beings can 
suffer real damage, ‘real distortion,’ when society misrecognizes 
them by endorsing a ‘demeaning’ or ‘contemptible’ picture of them. 
It is a mode of reduction or disfiguration of being. An imposed, 
demonized and distorted identity leads to the internalization of an 
inferior picture of the self, resulting in ‘self-hatred’ and often the 
tendency to play by the pejorative script written for one by others. 
Hence, “due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a 
vital human need” (Taylor, 1989, p. 26).iii Needless to say, the 
fundamental dialogical character of human life is premised on the 
social ontology of the self in contrast to individual ontology.  
The fact that only inter subjectively constituted experiences can 
provide me existence, coherence and integrity means, as Shannon 
Hoff states while considering Hegel’s conception of the law, that 
“my reality as a self is not merely inward and subjective, or merely 
for me, but has objective, concrete reality and is part of the true, 
shared world” (2014, p. 177). That the self obtains its coherence and 
integrity only in relation to its ‘outside’ is a stronger claim. Put 
differently, I need to get my reality confirmed by others by making 
them available for me as the ‘organs of interpretation.’ In 
developing the sense of the self, of our own understanding, they 
are ‘necessary reference points’ and the criteria for our effective 
engagement with reality. Without others who are my ‘organs of 
interpretations,’ I have neither a constitution nor an interpretation 
of my self. Hence, “our reality as individuals is an abstraction from 
a more primordial reality, an interpersonal situation. It is a heavily 




mediated reality, an accomplishment, not a starting point” (Hoff, 
2014, p. 178). 
The positive aspect of our reliance on recognition of others to 
become, realize and develop ourselves as ‘human’ is that in this 
way the constituents of our individuality come to us from the 
outside and so our individual reality becomes much richer than if it 
were based solely on our own designs. On the other hand, our 
dependence on others to develop as ‘significant’ and ‘capable’ 
persons can negatively impact our development before we could 
distinguish between positive and negative interventions and reject 
the negative ones. The very fact that our identity is scattered into 
pieces in the world surrounding us shows our vulnerability in the 
face of others and their views about us and our helplessness in 
being shaped by their values and expectations, which could be 
severely mistaken. So Hoff writes: “What gives us the capacity to 
be human, it also threatens to take it away” (2014, p. 182). 
Even as Taylor talks about identity as the frame of meaning-
making, he views it fluidly and rejects absolute identificationiv of 
individuals with their identity. Taylor notes that “our identities, as 
defined by whatever gives us our fundamental orientations, are in 
fact complex and many-tiered” (1989, p. 29), and that ”our identity 
is deeper and more many-sided than any of our possible 
articulations of it” (Ibid., 29). Even though Taylor seemingly takes a 
rigid communitarian view of identity, and calls for its recognition 
in “The Politics of Recognition” (1994), his Sources of the Self (1989) 
viewed identity as complex and fluid. That is, while he elaborates 
on the making of modern identity, he also shows how modern 
identity is constantly unmade due to the complex productions and 
transformations of self in modern times. According to him, the 
interior depth of the modern subject and its effort to be authentic, 
true to itself and original gives the modern individual a propensity 
to be ‘seeker’ and ‘finder’ of oneself. While we have a tendency to 
identify ourselves with a certain community, culture, ethnicity, 
religion and nation for various reasons, we also tend to transcend 
them and think of embracing what is beyond them. This 
unrestricted freedom for self and world transformation gives an air 
of ‘ambivalence’ to our sense of self, which is both troubling and 
liberating simultaneously.  
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The Hegelian notion of unfixed identity is based on the negative 
self and its constitutive element of ‘desire.’  Hegel views self-
consciousness as desire. Desire is reflexivity of the self (reflection 
into itself) and an ontological striving for something more. Human 
desire is not the mere animalistic desire for life, but the desire for 
recognition, as seen in the master-servant dialectic, where the self 
wants to negate or annihilate the Other initially, but having 
realized that pure negation would only deprive itself of essential 
recognition by the Other, is eventually satisfied by the recognition 
received from the Other. Judith Butler defines the desire of self in 
Hegel as “the incessant human effort to overcome external 
differences, a project to become self-sufficient subject for whom all 
things apparently different finally emerge as immanent features of 
the subject itself” (1987, p. 6). It is a process of becoming the self by 
making what is external to it internal and its own without 
forgetting that in the process of self-making the self also loses its 
given selfhood. Interpreting desire as the ‘principle of ontological 
displacement’ of the human subject, which fractures the 
metaphysically integrated self and disrupts the internal harmony of 
the subject and its ontological intimacy with the world, Butler 
argues for understanding identity in an anti-essentialist way and 
recognizing it as such. The subject is always in the ontological 
pursuit of itself, which is conditioned by the fundamental desire for 
self-reflection and the ‘pursuit of identity’ in whatever appears as 
‘different’ to it. Desire in the subject signifies reflexivity of 
consciousness, the necessity to become other to itself in order to 
know itself. As desire, consciousness finds itself outside each 
moment, and thus it become self-conscious (Butler, 1987, p. 7). In 
the Hegelian paradigm, what conditions the subject is the 
metaphysical doctrine of internal relations established through 
desire. Identity and the place where self-consciousness gets 
reflected are co-extensive, for Hegelian autonomy depends upon 
the doctrine of internal relations and each reflection of 
consciousness presupposes ‘ontological relatedness.’ When the 
subject is made by the ‘outside’ world, it knows that “it shares a 
common structure with that piece of world, that a prior and 
constituting relation conditions the possibility of reflection, and 
that the object of reflection is nothing other than that relation itself” 




(Ibid.). It is in this way Hegel establishes the ontological relatedness 
of the self with the world, or the self with the substance.  
Assuming the inherent ontological relatedness of the self with the 
world, John Russon talks about ‘infinite phenomenology’ in the 
Phenomenology. In his Infinite Phenomenology (2015), Russon argues 
that the primary lesson of Phenomenology centers on the 
‘dimensions of infinity’ within experience. According to him, Hegel 
shows us that experience is “inherently characterized by a conflict 
of infinities, most especially the conflict of the infinity of substance 
and the infinity of subjectivity” (Russon, 2015, pp. 3-4). The 
inherent complexity of/within experience is such that the terms ‘is’ 
and ‘now’, which we use for describing particular experiences 
cannot capture the form of experience as such. There is always an 
excess of the form of experience over the terms we use to describe 
it. “What we experience is not just an indeterminate, immediate 
field of being, but a world of diverse things” (Ibid., 7). In other 
words, the world of diverse things is ontologically related to us and 
part of us in terms of our constitution, experience and 
interpretation.  
Russon defines experience as “the explicit appearing of an object 
and an implicit appearing of a subject, a simultaneity of substance 
and subject…” (2015, p. 8), and notes that simple descriptions like 
‘is,’ ‘now,’ and ‘here’ hide within ‘a richness of mediation’ and 
subsequently the simultaneities in a single experience. According to 
him, the ‘fabric of experience’ is the ‘co-occurrence of substance 
and subject.’ That is to say, what appears to us or what we 
experience is always infinite. He explains the indefinite, infinite 
exposure within our experience thus:  
We exist in a state of exposure: this is the basic form of 
experience recognized by both Kant and Hegel. By 
exposure, I mean the way that we are unprotectedly in 
contact with an outside that defines us but that exceeds our 
grasp, an infinity that claims us without our having the 
option to refuse, a consecutive imperative to which our 
experience is answerable…. With Hegel, we notice that we 
are exposed in further ways, and, furthermore, the 
dimensions of our exposure are in tension with each other. 
Desire—the experience of our singular subjectivity—is one 
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such dimension, one such domain of opaque, alien 
determination (Russon, 2015, pp. 14-15).  
That is, our experience is a finite situatedness—a ‘being in the 
world,’ in Heidegger’s language, and at the same time, finite 
situatedness has an ‘infinity of substance (reality) and subject that 
is its form.’ “I exist as an inherently finite crystallization of what is 
inherently infinite” (p. 12). One must note here that the fact that we 
exist in a radically infinite exposure within our each experience 
makes our selves more penetrable and porous. Hoff writes: “The 
experience of each human being is not strictly had or made by that 
single human being; it is, rather, an experience made with and by 
others, directly and indirectly, and thus each human being is, in 
some particular sense, dependent on those others, needy of those 
others, for its own sense of self” (2014, p. 175).  
Butler’s conceptualization of identity must be seen from the 
background of this radical exposure of human beings and their 
infinite experience. The subject who already understands itself as 
limited, confined and less autonomous, discovers later the 
possibility of reflection and relation as part of its very constitution. 
“The subjects thus cultivate a more expanded conception of its 
place” (Butler, 1987, p. 8). Analysis of desire and experience of 
desire will take us to the conclusion that each moment the subject 
desires in pursuit of its identity, it experiences desire as posing the 
problem of identity too. That the subject desires identity means that 
it throws into problem the same identity and poses the question of 
the metaphysical place of human identity. In the satisfaction of 
desire, this question is answered for the subject, but only to get 
dissatisfied more due to its incapacity to consume the unending 
objects of desire. “In effect, desire is an interrogative mode of being, 
a corporeal questioning of identity and place” (Ibid., 9). This calls 
for questioning and subverting a given identity each time for better 
ones, according to Butler. It is Hegelian ontology of the self that 
prompts Butler to suggest a ‘social ontology of the body’ based on 
the anti essentialist notion of identity and reject the ‘individual 
ontology of the body,’ based on an essentialist notion of identity. 
As an interrogative mode of being/identity, desiring subjects each 
time subvert themselves and other selves,v and so, to enhance an 




essential sociality among them the ‘generalized precariousness’ of 
human condition has to be recognized.  
3. Identity, History and the Public Sphere 
Modernity as a historical condition of human experience is an 
attempt to consider the human being as the abstract individual in 
her universality without taking into account the inescapable 
horizons behind the formation of self-identity, and at the same time 
a momentous failure of the realization of this project because 
markers of identity continued to colour the supposedly ‘modern’ 
judgments’ about abstract individuals. The articulation of 
recognition of the inescapable horizons of identity and the 
aspiration for universality, which is my focal point in this paper, is 
typified nowhere more starkly in the life of the modern Indian 
nation than in Ambedkar, who fought for the recognition of Dalit 
identity while remaining the principal architect of the modern 
Indian Constitution that vouches for secularism and equal 
citizenship. Partha Chatterjee observes that “the tension between 
utopian homogeneity and real heterogeneity” was played out most 
dramatically in the intellectual and political career of Ambedkar 
(2004, p. 8). Ambedkar’s speech to the Constituent Assembly on 25 
November 1949 is revealing in this regard. 
[W]e are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In 
politics we will have equality and in social and economic 
life we will have inequality. In politics we will be 
recognizing the principle of one man one vote and one vote 
one value. In our social and economic life, we shall, by 
reason of our social and economic structure, continue to 
deny the principle of one man one value … If we continue 
to deny it for long, we will do so only by putting our 
political democracy in peril. (1994, p. 1216) 
Hannah Arendt observes in a similar vein that “one can resist only 
in terms of the identity that is under attack” even as one aspires for 
universal human respect (1955, p. 18). While it is clear from the life 
and writings of Ambedkar and several other contemporary figures 
of resistance that recognition of identity must go along with the 
desire for universality and neutrality, the ontological 
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considerations about the self that I have discussed in the first 
section of this paper get more complicated when we come to the 
public sphere where social and political interactions do take place. 
A case in point is the well-known 2015 suicide note of Rohith 
Vemula, a Dalit research scholar at the University of Hyderabad, in 
which he wrote poignantly that “[t]he value of a man was reduced 
to his immediate identity and nearest possibility. To a vote, to a 
number, to a thing. Never was a man treated as a mind” (Sawhney, 
2016, p. 119). Rohith, like Ambedkar, asserted and demanded 
recognition of his Dalit identity, despite clearly rejecting the 
reduction of human beings to their immediate identity and 
resisting the hyper-recognition of identity. The following verse of 
the African-American lesbian feminist, Pat Parker, occurring in her 
poem “For the White Person Who Wants to Know How to Be My 
Friend” is representative of this yearning for recognition without 
hyper-recognition: “The first thing you do is to forget that I’m 
black./ Second, you must never forget that I’m black” (1978, p. 68). 
This necessary contradiction between identity and universality 
could be seen in any demand for recognition, be it of a single 
person or of a group. There is an extent to which someone wants 
her/his identity to be recognized. The self feels throttled and 
misrecognized by hyper-recognition of the identity that she/he 
wants others to recognize. Hyper-recognition denies one’s 
universal humanity and openness towards indeterminate and 
infinite possibilities. In other words, while the horizon of one’s own 
meaning-making needs to be recognized by others in public, one 
cannot be reduced purely to one’s identity without the possibilities 
for achieving liberation from its oppressive markers in terms of 
universal humanness.  
This discussion on identity and universality is meaningless without 
a considered conception of the public sphere. In the traditional 
understanding of the public sphere, we are obliged to appear in 
public not as selves born and brought up in families with distinct 
cultural, regional, historical, linguistic, religious and ethnic 
backgrounds, but as abstract individuals having the potential to be 
removed from history. Hoff rejects this view for disregarding the 
significance of ‘history’ for an identity in an attempt to impose on a 
person an ideal universality of bare humanity. In “Politics in 




Public” (2015), Hoff elucidates the significance of talking about 
imagined universal humanness in the public sphere only after 
taking cognizance of and in juxtaposition with ‘history’ because the 
public sphere is a space where these two aspects of human beings 
get intertwined, come in dialogue and conflict with each other. To 
do this, she makes a qualitative difference between private and the 
public sphere with a typical understanding of the former as a space 
of ‘dynamic familiarity’ and a ‘non-neutral orientation’ towards 
specific human beings, which does not demand from us an 
explanation of ourselves, and a concern about our appearance so as 
to give an account of ourselves to others and validate our pursuits 
(Hoff, 2015, p. 260). On the other hand, in public we are interacting 
with less familiar people while being extra conscious about the fact 
that “we are on display to others for whom our identity is a 
question. We are ‘looked at’ in public, in a way that implies a 
question about who we are and what we are like, and we speak 
and act in ways that are ‘on display’ insofar as they are unfamiliar 
to those with whom we are interacting” (Ibid., 261).  
From this point of view, Hoff shows how our ‘intimate and social 
history with others’ will necessarily have an impact on our public 
interaction. Referring to Frantz Fanon’s commanding account of 
how the history of colonialism altered the ways in which ‘people 
relate to each other and the public space,’ Hoff dismisses the idea of 
a discrete individuality that is supposed to neutrally engage in the 
public sphere with others. She emphasizes that the ‘history’ of 
identity needs to be seriously considered in the public sphere, 
which is imagined as a site of sophisticated and cultured 
interaction. Hoff asserts,  
“To presume that we are dealing solely with individuals is 
to effectively erase the histories by which their significance 
is constituted and to misconceive their identity as the result 
of their decisions and a matter of their responsibility”. 
(Hoff, 2014, p. 263) 
 Because of this, according to Hoff, we never interact with ‘discrete 
individuality’ in the public sphere but with all significant others 
and communities that have formed the individual’s ‘preferences 
and orientations’ and, therefore, implicitly with these parties as 
well (p. 262). Despite the revolutionary aspects of modern 
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individuality that invests persons with rights, its inherent tendency 
to conceptualize human beings in abstraction from society, and its 
aspiration to universalize human identity by erasing history could 
turn out to be limiting and tyrannical. This tendency of modernity 
should be resisted because we don’t merely exist merely in the 
present, cut off from others and the world, but are affected by the 
past, aspire for the future and are exposed to the ‘outside’. As per 
the original Latin meaning of ‘existence’, we always ‘stand out.’  
Having discussed the ontology of identity and the need for identity 
to be recognized in the social interactions of the public sphere, I 
now want to turn to polity. How must a polity, an organized 
population of different identity-groups with their own history, 
engage with an identity? If political life is about organizing and 
uniting human beings in their universality and integrating them 
into a genuine ‘public,’ how should the polity relate to historically 
oppressed identities? It is in this context that Ambedkar’s concern 
with social and economic inequalities embedded in the Indian 
society and his longing for universal equality becomes meaningful. 
The inherent tension between identity and universality is situated 
in our finite being exposed to infinity. We can experience infinity 
only in our fragile finiteness. It is in relation to determinate ways of 
life and communities that we can experience human life and to that 
extent their significance cannot be denied; but they do not fully 
determine the trajectories of our existence because we can outgrow 
them as they necessarily are finite sites of exposure to infinity. Hoff 
further asserts that, “[T]he various contexts of human life operate 
as contexts of determination but also as contexts of exposure or 
propulsion out into the world” (Hoff, 2014, p. 183). Ambedkar 
asserted the cultural specificity of Dalit oppression and identity, 
mobilized and sensitized them, fought for their dignity and 
recognition in the public sphere, and reminded India that equal 
voting rights would not ensure social and economic equality. At 
the same time, he also stood in the forefront of building a polity 
founded on universal equality and individual rights as the architect 
of the Indian Constitution. In other words, he aspired to realize the 
infinite possibilities of the modern horizon without being blind to 
the severely limiting realities of the situation.  




However, when we examine the cost of the political production of 
identities, there is an urgency to be vigilant. The tendency of 
modern nation states to produce the ‘internal other’ in opposition 
to the ‘national self’ and found nationalism on xenophobia makes 
marginal identities appallingly vulnerable. In Frames of War (2009), 
Judith Butler demonstrates how grievable and recognition-worthy 
lives of citizens of powerful nations like America and how 
ungrievable and recognition-unworthy lives of others such as the 
Iraqis are politically produced. The core issue, she observes, is not 
merely representational/epistemological; rather, it is ‘ ontological’ 
because it is about the being of life and its recognition. The 
ontological framework decides in such contexts about the being of 
life through selective and exclusive means. That is, ‘human 
identity’vi is decided by ‘mechanisms of power’ according to 
majoritarian norms after removing certain sections of people from 
the moral space of concerns. The tendency to isolate certain sections 
of people from their historical and temporal realities in order to 
establish a ‘regulative ideal of humanness’, be it in morphological, 
sociological, or moral terms, leads to the production of exclusion. 
Humanness produced by ‘ontological frameworks’ and represented 
by ‘epistemological frameworks’ divide human beings into 
recognition-worthy and recognition-unworthy. Since any 
regulation of human beings is a political operation to exclude the 
unpopular others, Butler calls for frequent revisions of existing 
views of ‘humanness’. While it is not possible to have a politics 
without regulation, Butler calls for relentless subversion of 
officially recognized human identity. 
According to Butler, life and death are possible only in a relation to 
a ‘framework’, which is deeper and philosophically more 
significant than Taylor’s ‘frame’ in which human beings form 
identities and make meaning. “There is no ‘life itself’, rather, only 
conditions of life. Life is something which requires conditions in 
order to become livable life and indeed in order to become 
grievable” (Butler, 2009, p. 5). To be a body, as we have seen, one 
must be exposed to sociopolitical forces and claims. Like Hegel, 
Butler, thus, conceptualizes a desiring and inherently open self-
consciousness, which does not allow one to ‘belong’ fixedly to 
anywhere. This is to say, ontology of the body exists only as a social 
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ontology and a social ontology of the body already always 
envelops the human being. Human beings are condemned to be in 
social and political ‘frameworks’ according to Butler. Normative 
frameworks delimiting the sphere of humanness, lead to 
‘normative recognition’ and produce subjects worthy and 
unworthy of recognition. Thus, recognizability is not a quality of 
individual human beings; rather, both recognizability and 
grievability are a function of social norms. Only if one’s loss 
matters, value of his/her life appears. “Grievability is a 
presupposition for the life that matters” (Butler, 2009, p. 14). Life 
would be inconceivable without grievability as its precondition, 
and so grievability precedes or makes possible the apprehension of 
the precariousness of a life. Butler embraces an anti-idealizing and 
anti-identifying view of humans with her conception of an 
incessantly self-replenishing and self-repulsing self as its basis. 
Arguing that “human being is a differentiating effect of power” in 
Precarious Life, she calls for the recognition of the ‘generalized 
precariousness’ of the human condition (Butler, 2004, p. 40). There 
is no universal norm of humanness, no universal humanness or 
human identity. There is no human life as such. Rather there are 
only ‘conditions’ which make humanness/human life possible, or 
‘conditions’ which produce and sustain humanness in one form 
and destroy it in another form. Hence, recognition has to be 
concerned with ‘generalized precariousness’. Butler, thus, proposes 
a universal in response to the contemporary dialectic of the political 
valuation of life. She states in Giving an Account of Oneself: “The 
problem is not with universality as such but with an operation of 
universality that fails to be responsive to cultural particularity and 
fails to undergo a reformulation of itself in response to the social 
and cultural conditions it includes within its scope of applicability” 
(2005, p. 6). 
The ultimate lesson from the dialectical principles which Hegel 
puts forth in his Phenomenology is that the differences between the 
infinite and the finite, between particular and universal never lead 
to a totally abstract universal. From this, we should understand 
Hegel as someone who does not propose an imagined universality, 
which has an ultimate capacity to wield hegemony over 
particularities and differences, but as someone who proposes a 
tolerant embrace of the differences. In current scholarship, 




Hegelianism is an attitude that promotes a patient exploration of 
plurality of attitudes and a viewpoint that does not end up in a 
closed ism. Russon states that the Phenomenology’s method and 
project is “ultimately to bear witness in vigilant openness to the 
unacknowledged absolutes that leave their trace in finite 
experience” (2015, p. 4). Hegel ultimately declares that ‘infinity’ or 
‘absoluteness’ is the ingredient of and is immanent in our present 
experience and is not an abstract entity beyond experience. For 
Russon, this project, therefore, is one of “unearthing of more and 
more fundamental ‘infinites,’ more fundamental ‘absolutes,’ that 
characterize, contextualize, or constitute our experience” (Ibid., 15).  
In conclusion, it must be reiterated that the self as a fixed identity 
without negations is inconceivable because it is open to the outside, 
socially embedded, constituted from without and never an entity 
unto itself. It follows from the notion of the negative self that 
human identity is not in a possession of the self, but it emerges out 
of a process of dynamic interactions. On the basis of this Hegelian 
insight, contemporary Hegelian philosophers, as we have seen, 
give an account of the complex reality behind our appearance in 
space and time as seemingly individuated and self-enclosed beings. 
The division of the self in constant dialectic does not give room for 
a dead reality, which has no further dialectical potential. The 
complications emanating from the constant making, unmaking and 
remaking of the self in the public sphere in its yearning for both 
identity and universality through the recognition, misrecognition 
and condemnation invested on it by others has been the subject 
matter of this paper. The only certain conclusion that can be drawn 
from this discussion is the following: since the humanness that we 
recognize is not an absolute and universal notion but a contextual 
and historical construct, a function of power and force, if there is 
any provisionally universal ethical guide for the negotiation 
between recognition of the Other’s identity and universality, this 
seems to be the Other’s precariousness and vulnerability—the 
ungrievability of the ‘other’ life. 
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Endnotes 
i The basis of identity could be linguistic, religious, regional, cultural or 
ethnic, but in all of them evaluations based on notions of the good and 
the meaningful unfailingly happen.  
ii Taylor adds that though the ‘conversation’ with significant others who 
‘shaped’ us lasts even after we outgrow them, “we should strive to 
define ourselves on our own to the fullest extent possible…. We need 
relationships to fulfill, but not to define, ourselves” (1994, p. 33).  
iii Taylor traces the history of ‘individualized dignity’ and notes that 
social hierarchies, which used to be the basis for ‘honor’ and inequalities, 
came to be disregarded with modernity, and thus ‘dignity’ of individual 
human beings and equal recognition came into existence. Identity, 




                                                                                                                                    
which was by social position in earlier societies where one’s glory was 
the other’s shame, came to be undermined by the ideal of individualized 
dignity. This democratic conception of ‘individualized identity’ was 
established on the basis of Kantian morality, the source of which was 
from within,and it replaced both the idea of utilitarian morality of 
calculations and consequences, and the idea of Divine morality based on 
reward and punishment. The individualization of identity is modern in 
the sense that it invokes human beings to be in touch with themselves, 
with their inner voices, rather than with God, community or nature. 
Taylor views the modern individualization of identity as leading to the 
conception of authenticity because it rejects externally imposed identity. 
His conception of identity in terms of individually negotiated social 
being is a call to recognize the authenticity of socially embedded 
individuality. 
iv Identification strictly means here what Butler calls solidification of 
one’s identity, be it culture, caste, region, religion or nationality, an easy 
way to negate the differences within that identity and homogenize it. 
Identification in this sense is homogenization considered negatively. By 
identification of one identity, we miss the differencing of/in that identity, 
its fluid and endless (re)formations, and thus its complexity and 
richness. 
v Hegel calls the desired Other as ‘desired Desire’. 
vi Butler uses the phrase ‘human identity’ to emphasize that humanness 
as such is selectively and politically ‘produced’ in contrast to my 
juxtaposition of ‘identity’ with ‘universal humanness.’ 
